Recently, cryptographic schemes based on the user's attributes have been proposed. An Attribute-Based Group Signature (ABGS) scheme is a kind of group signature schemes, where a user with a set of attributes can prove anonymously whether she has these attributes or not. An access tree is applied to express the relationships among some attributes. However, previous schemes do not provide the changing an access tree. In this paper, we propose a Dynamic ABGS scheme that enables an access tree to be changed. Our ABGS is efficient in that re-issuing of the attribute certificate previously issued for each user is not necessary. Moreover, calculations depending on the number of attributes are calculated on the domain of a pairing. Therefore, the number of calculations in a pairing does not depend on the number of attributes associated with a signature. Finally, we discuss how our ABGS can be applied to an anonymous survey for collection of attribute statistics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, cryptographic schemes based on the user's attributes have been proposed. Attribute-Based Group Signature (ABGS) schemes [9] , [10] are a kind of Group Signature (GS) schemes [7] , [11] , where a user with a set of attributes can prove anonymously whether she has these attributes or not. ABGS schemes have been proposed by Khader [9] , [10] using Goyal's attribute-based encryption scheme [8] and Boneh's GS scheme [5] . To the best of our knowledge, these are the only proposals for an ABGS. Usually, users have many kinds of attributes, and there exist some relationships among these attributes. An access tree [8] , [9] , [10] is applied to express these relationships. However, [9] and [10] schemes do not provide the changing of the relationships among attributes. This means that attributes and relationships among these attributes can be determined only once. This is not practical. Moreover, in all previous ABGSs [9] , [10] , the number of calculations in a pairing depends on the number of attributes associated with a signature. Our Contribution : In this paper, we propose a Dynamic ABGS scheme that enables an access tree to be changed. Our ABGS is efficient in that re-issuing of the attribute certificate previously issued for each user is not necessary. Moreover, calculations depending on the number of attributes are calculated on the domain of a pairing. Therefore, the number of calculations in a pairing does not depend on the number of attributes associated with a signature. Finally, we discuss how our ABGS can be applied to an anonymous survey for collection of attribute statistics. Organization : The paper is organized as follows. Definitions are given in Section II. Our scheme is described in Section III. Security analysis is performed in Section IV. Efficiency comparisons are presented in Section V. The application of our ABGS in an anonymous survey for the Collection of Attribute Statistics is demonstrated in Section VI.
II. DEFINITIONS

A. Bilinear Groups
Definition 1: (Bilinear Groups) We use bilinear groups and a bilinear map defined as follows: 1) G 1 , G 2 and G 3 are cyclic groups of prime order p.
2) g 1 and g 2 are generators of G 1 and G 2 , respectively. 3) ψ is an efficiently computable isomorphism ψ : G 2 → G 1 with ψ(g 2 ) = g 1 . 4) e is an efficiently computable bilinear map e : G 1 × G 2 → G 3 with the following properties.
B. Access Tree
Let Att = {att 1 , . . . , att m } be a set of attributes. For Γ ⊆ 2 Att \ {∅}, Γ satisfies the monotone property: if ∀ B, C ⊆ Att, B ∈ Γ and B ⊆ C, then C ∈ Γ holds. Let access structures for Att be a set of Γ which satisfies the monotone property. An access tree [8] , [9] , [10] T is used for expressing an access structure by using a tree structure. An access tree is a tree, where threshold gates are defined on each interior node of the tree, and the leaves are associated with attributes. These attributes are subsets of Att. Let x be the number of children of node x, and k x (0 < k x ≤ x ) be the threshold value on the threshold gate of node x. We call the threshold gate "OR gate" when k x = 1, and "AND gate" when k x = x . The notation Leaves |= T expresses the fact that a set of attributes Leaves satisfies the access tree T .
C. Model and Security Definitions
In this subsection, we define the model of an ABGS. An ABGS is a kind of GS, where a user U i with a set of attributes Γ i ⊆ Att = {att 1 , . . . , att m } can prove anonymously whether she has these attributes or not. U i has a membership certificate A i and a set of attribute certificates {T i,j } attj ∈Γi . U i makes a group signature associated with ζ ⊆ Γ i . Usually, for a set of attributes Att, we construct an access tree to consider all relationships among these attributes. However, the access tree is changed when some threshold values are changed, or some attributes are deleted. Therefore, we define the model of the ABGS accepting a change of an access tree. We do not provide for the fact that a new attribute att ∈ Att = {att 1 , . . . , att m } is added in an access tree. In this case, we have to re-issue an attribute certificate for users with att to execute the Join algorithm again. Let GM be the group manager. k the security parameter, params the system parameter, Att = {att 1 , . . . , att m } the universe of attributes, T r the r-th access tree with a set of attributes {att}, where att ∈ Att is assigned on each leaf, T r the public values associated with T r , gpk the group public key, ik the group secret key which is used for issuing a membership certificate and making T r , ok the opening key which is used for the opening procedure to reveal the signers' identification from the group signature, (upk i , usk i ) the verification/signing key of a signature scheme DSig, sk i the member secret key for U i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n), Γ i ⊆ Att attributes of U i , and reg be the registration table for Open algorithm. Note that sk i includes both A i and {T i,j } attj ∈Γi . In Join algorithm, we use the notation Join( input of GM , input of user ). If the access tree T r is changed to T r+1 , then GM runs BuildTree(params, ik, T r+1 ), and opens T r+1 , which is the public information associated with T r+1 .
Definition 3: Anonymity : Anonymity requires that for all PPT A, the advantage of A on the following game, is negligible.
• Setup: Let T 0 be the initial access tree. The challenger runs KeyGen(params), and obtains gpk, ik and ok. Moreover, the challenger runs BuildTree(params, ik, T 0 ), and obtains T 0 . A is given params, gpk, T 0 and ik. • Phase1: A can send these queries as follows:
-Join : A requests the join procedure for honest member U i . A plays the role of corrupted GM on these queries. 
where T * is the access tree on the challenge phase. The challenger uniformly selects b ∈ R {0, 1}, and responds with a group signature on M * by group member U ib . • Phase2: A can make the Signing, Corruption, Open, Join and Re-BuildTree queries. Note that Corruption queries include both U i0 and U i1 .
In Join queries, A can play the role of corrupted GM (the same as in SndToU oracle, which is defined in [2] ). Moreover, we consider the Anonymity for Key-Exposure, namely, corruption queries for U i0 and U i1 can be admitted in Phase 2. Even after a secret key is exposed, signatures produced by the member before Key-Exposure remain anonymous. A similar definition of our Key-Exposure has been given in [3] for the ring signature scheme. Moreover, our definition is the CCA-Anonymity model [5] , [7] , namely, open queries in the Anonymity game can be admitted.
Definition 4: Traceability requires that for all PPT A, the probability that A wins the following game is negligible.
• Setup: Let T 0 be the initial access tree. The challenger runs KeyGen(params), and obtains gpk, ik and ok. Moreover, the challenger runs BuildTree(params, ik, T 0 ), and obtains T 0 . A is given params, gpk, T 0 and ok.
• Queries: A can issue the Signing, Corruption, Join and Re-BuildTree queries. All queries are the same as in the Anonymity game, except Join.
-Join : A requests the Join procedure for corrupted member U i .
• Output: A outputs a message M * , σ * and ζ * . Moreover, T * is the access tree in this phase, and T * is the public information associated with T * . A wins if (1) Verify(params, gpk, M * , σ * , ζ * , T * ) = 1, (2) Open(params, gpk, ok, σ * , ζ * , T * , M * , reg) = 0, and (3) A has not obtained σ * in Signing queries on M * , ζ * and T * . The advantage of A is defineed as the probability of A wins.
In Join queries, A can play the role of corrupted users (the same as in SndToI oracle, which is defined in [2] ).
Definition 5: Collusion-Resistance requires that for all PPT A, the probability that A wins the following game is negligible.
• Setup: Let T 0 be the initial access tree. The challenger runs KeyGen(params), and obtains gpk, ik and ok. Moreover, the challenger runs BuildTree(params, ik, T 0 ), and obtains T 0 . A is given params, gpk and T 0 . • Queries: A can issue the Signing, Corruption, Join and Re-BuildTree queries. All queries are the same as in the Anonymity game. • Output: Finally, A outputs M * , σ * and ζ * . T * is the access tree in this phase, and T * is the public information associated with T * . A wins if (1) Verify(params, gpk, M * , σ * , ζ * , T * ) = 1, and (2) A has not obtained attribute certificates associated with ζ * corresponding to a single user.
This property indicates that, for example, there are two users U i0 and U i1 with {T i0,j } attj ∈Γi 0 and {T i1,j } attj ∈Γi 1 , respectively. We assume that
Then U i0 and U i1 cannot make a valid group signature with ζ * even if U i0 and U i1 collude with each other.
Definition 6: Non-Frameability requires that for all PPT A, the probability that A wins the following game is negligible.
• Setup: Let T 0 be the initial access tree. The challenger runs KeyGen(params), and obtains gpk, ik and ok. Moreover, the challenger runs BuildTree(params, ik, T 0 ), and obtains T 0 . A is given params, gpk, T 0 , ik and ok. • Queries: A can issue the Signing, Corruption, Join and Re-BuildTree queries. All queries are the same as in the Anonymity game. • Output: Finally, A outputs a message M * , an honest member U i * , σ * and ζ * . T * is the access tree in this phase, and T * is the public information associated with T * . A wins if (1) Verify(params, gpk, M * , σ * , ζ * , T * ) = 1, (2) σ * opens to an honest member U i * , (3) A has not obtained σ * in Signing queries on M * , U i * and ζ * , and (4) A has not obtained sk i * in Corruption queries on U i * . The advantage of A is defined as the probability of A wins.
III. PROPOSED SCHEMES
In this section, an ABGS together with an assignment of secret values to access trees is presented.
A. Assignment of Secret Values to Access Trees
The previous schemes [10] , [9] use a "Top-Down Approach" construction for access trees (when threshold gates are defined on each interior node of the tree and the leaves are associated with attributes) as follows:
• A secret value of the root node is chosen.
• A polynomial q root (x) of degree "threshold value −1" is defined such that q root (0) equals the secret value of the root node. • A secret value of a child node is defined such as q root (index(child)). • Secret values of all nodes can be defined to execute this procedure recursively. If the access tree is changed, then the above Top-Down Approach construction has to be executed again. This means that the secret values that are associated with attributes have to be re-issued to corresponding users, because these values have to be changed. In our proposal, a "Bottom-Up Approach" construction is introduced. The order of our construction is different from that of the Top-Down Approach construction, namely, first all secret values are chosen for each attribute associated with each leaf. These secret values of leaves will not be changed when the access tree is changed. Idea : For a node x associated with the threshold value k x , x − k x dummy nodes will be opened, where x is the number of children of x. Next, the threshold value is changed from k x to x . Then, all threshold gates become AND gates. Children with k x or more can compute the secret value of their parent node by using the number of x −k x public dummy nodes. We define functions AddDummyNode which adds dummy nodes to the access tree, AssignedValue which assigns secret values for nodes on the access tree, and MakeSimplifiedTree which makes a simplified tree associated with a set of leaves. Let index be the function which returns the index of the node, and p be a prime number. We assume that T includes Att. AddDummyNode(T ) : This algorithm takes as input T , and returns the extended access tree T ext . 1) For an interior node x of T , the number of dummy nodes
3) All nodes are assigned unique index numbers. 4) The resulting tree, called T ext , is outputted. Let D T be a set of dummy nodes determined by AddDum-myNode. We assume that T ext includes D T . Moreover, let s j ∈ Z p be a secret value for an attribute att j ∈ Att. Let S = {s j } attj ∈Att . AssignedValue(p, S, T ext ) : This algorithm takes as input p, S and T ext and returns a secret value s x ∈ Z p for each node x of T ext . Let {child} x be the set of node x's children except the dummy nodes, and {d} x be the set of node x's dummy nodes.
1) For an interior node x of T ext , a polynomial q x of degree x − 1 is assigned as follows: a) For att j ∈ {child} x , let q x be a polynomial of degree at most x − 1 which passes though (index(att j ), s j ), where s j ∈ S (j = 1, 2, . . . , x ). b) For a dummy node d j ∈ {d} x , the secret value
2) Repeat the above procedure up to the root node, s T := q root (0) is the secret value of T . 3) Output {s dj } dj ∈DT and s T . MakeSimplifiedTree(Leaves, T ext ) : This algorithm takes as input the set of attributes Leaves ⊆ Att satisfying Leaves |= T , and returns the simplified access tree T Leaves (which is the access tree associated with Leaves) and a product of Lagrange coefficients Δ leaf .
1) The set of attributes {att j } attj ∈Att\Leaves are deleted from T ext . 2) An interior node x has children less than the threshold value (namely, x ), and is deleted from T ext along with x's descendants. 3) Let D Leaves be the set of dummy nodes which have remained after (1) and (2), and T Leaves be the access tree after (1) a) Let P ath leaf := {leaf, parent 1 , . . . , parent nleaf = root} be the set of nodes that appears in the path from leaf to root node. b) Compute Δ leaf := node∈P athleaf \root L node .
B. Proposed Attribute-Based Group Signature Scheme
In this subsection, we propose the ABGS by using our assignment (Section III-A). Our ABGS uses the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [6] for both CCA-Anonymity and Key-Exposure properties, and a concurrently secure Join algorithm proposed in [7] . Let NIZK be a Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge proof, SP K be a Signature of Proof of Knowledge, and Ext-Commit be an extractable commitment scheme. Let T 0 be the initial access tree. Note that if an access tree is changed, then GM runs BuildTree(params, ik, T r+1 ), and opens T r+1 , which is the public information associated with T r+1 .
• Setup(1 k ) 1) GM selects cyclic groups of G 1 , G 2 , and G 3 with prime order p, an isomorphism ψ : G 2 → G 1 , a bilinear map e : G 1 ×G 2 → G 3 , and a hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z p . 2) GM selects a generator g 2 ∈ G 2 and g 3 , g 4 ∈ R G 1 , and sets g 1 = ψ(g 2 ). G 2 , G 3 , e, ψ, H, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , g 4 , Att) .
and AssignedValue(p, S, T ext 0 ), and gets {s dj } dj ∈DT 0 and s T0 .
is a member certificate and {T i,j } attj ∈Γi is the set of attribute certificates as follows:
1) U i picks y i ∈ R Z p , and computes c i = Ext-Commit(y i ), F i = E yi and π 1 = NIZK{y i :
If π 2 is not valid, then abort. 7) U i makes S i,Ai = DSig uski (A i ), and sends S i,Ai to GM . 8) GM verifies S i,Ai with respect to upk i and A i . If S i,Ai is valid, then GM sends x i to U i , and adds (U i , A i ) to reg. 9) U i checks the relation A (xi+γ) i =g 1 E yi to verify whether e(A i , g 2 ) xi e(A i , w)e(E, g 2 ) −yi ? = e(g 1 , g 2 ).
• Sign(param, gpk, sk i , M, ζ i , T r )
A signer U i signs a message M ∈ {0, 1} * as follows:
Concretely, U i computes V as follows:
s τ = r τ + cτ and s δ = r δ + cδ.
) A signer U i proves the knowledge of (α, x i , τ, δ) which satisfies the 5 above relations described in SP K V . The first relation captures whether a signer has a valid membership certificate issued by the Join algorithm or not. The last relation captures whether a signer has valid attribute certificates associated with the set of attributes ζ i |= T r or not. • Verify(param, gpk, M, σ, 
ζ, T r )
A verifier verifies a group signature σ associated with the set of attributes ζ.
1) The verifier runs MakeSimplifiedTree(ζ, T ext r ), and gets T ζ r , Δ j (att j ∈ ζ) and Δ dj (d j ∈ D ζ r ). Let |ζ| = φ.
2) The verifier computes g d = dj ∈D ζ r g Open(param, gpk, ok, σ, ζ, T r , M, reg) 1) GM verifies the validity of σ by using Verify(param, gpk, M, σ, ζ, T r ). If σ is not a valid signature, then GM outputs ⊥.
If there is no entry in reg, then GM outputs 0.
IV. SECURITY
Let p, q H and q S be order of bilinear groups, and the number of hash queries and signature queries, respectively. Our scheme is based on the discrete logarithm (DL), eXternal Diffie-Hellman (XDH) [5] (it is the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption over G 1 ), and q-strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) [4] assumptions.
Theorem 1: The proposed scheme satisfies Anonymity under the XDH assumption (namely DDH assumption over G 1 ), i.e., Adv anon (A) ≤ qS qH p + m · ddh holds, where ddh is the DDH-advantage of some algorithms and m = |Att|.
Theorem 2: We suppose an adversary A breaks the Traceability of the proposed scheme with the advantage . Then, we can construct an algorithm B that breaks the q-SDH assumption with the advantage 1 6 (1 − 1 p )(1 − qS qH p ) . Theorem 3: We suppose an adversary A breaks the Non-Frameability of the proposed scheme with the advantage . Then, we can construct an algorithm B that breaks the DL assumption with the advantage 1 12 (1 + 1 n )(1 − qS qH p ) . Theorem 4: The probability that a signature by forged attribute certificates passes the verification, Pr(Verify(params, gpk, M, σ, ζ, T ) = 1 ∧ ζ |= T ), is
, where φ is the number of attributes associated with a signature.
Theorem 5: Even if some malicious participants U i1 , . . . , U ik (k > 1) with the set of attributes ζ i1 , . . . , ζ ik collude, they cannot make a valid signature associated with an attribute tree T r , where (∪ k j=1 ζ ij ) |= T r and ζ ij |= T r (j = 1, . . . , k) with non-negligible probability.
We omit these proofs, and put them in the full version of this paper.
V. COMPARISONS
Let ζ (|ζ| = φ) be the set of attributes which is associated with a signature, D ζ be the set of dummy nodes which is defined as ζ, and |Att| = m. Moreover, let r be the number of revoked members [9] . We assume that the computational estimations are made according to [11] . In our scheme, Verification costs are the lowest, because the number of calculations in a pairing does not depend on the number of attributes associated with a signature. There is room for argument regarding the Signing costs. Moreover, our scheme provides Dynamic property, VI. APPLICATION OF ABGS IN ANONYMOUS SURVEY FOR COLLECTION OF ATTRIBUTE STATISTICS In this section, we discuss how our ABGS can be applied to an anonymous survey for collection of attribute statistics. An anonymous survey is used as follows: When we apply the GS to a business system offering some services to group members, each member's personal information is not exposed. Moreover, a service provider can verify whether each user is valid or not. However, it is difficult for a service provider to obtain a collection of user's attribute statistics to improve service contents. In [13] , an anonymous survey has been proposed which is a protocol executed among trusted third parties (TTPs). Moreover, the relationships among some attributes, e.g., (female ∧ 20s), can be handled in the statistics information. However, a distributor cannot verify whether users properly construct the ciphertext or not. In [12] , an anonymous survey has been proposed using the Open algorithm of Ateniese et. al. GS [1] . A distributor can verify whether users properly make the ciphertext or not, to verify the validity of group signatures. Because one attribute certificate is issued for an attribute type, it is difficult as the relationships among some attributes to be handled in the statistics information. There is an obvious solution: new attribute types such as att C = att A ∧ att B are defined. However, the number of all attribute types are represented by O(2 m ), where m is the number of all attributes. We solve this attribute increase problem to apply an ABGS. 1) A user makes a group signature σ associated with the set of attributes ζ to use our ABGS. 2) The user encrypts ζ to use the public key of a distributor, and sends both σ and the encrypted ζ to the distributor. 3) The distributor decrypts ζ, and verifies whether σ is valid or not. 4) The statistics information is the collection of ζ. To collect the set of attributes ζ, the distributor can obtain the statistics of attributes without any other information, because the distributor does not know the opening key which is used for the opening procedure to reveal the signer's identification from the group signature. Moreover, the distributor can verify whether users properly made the ciphertext or not, to verify that the validity of group signatures is the same as in [12] . Moreover, the relationships among some attributes can be handled in the statistics information in the same way as in [13] , without increasing the number of attribute certificates of each user. Indeed, the number of attribute certificates of each user is represented by O(m). Of course, relationships among some attributes which one wants to reflect with the statistics information are different in each case. Our scheme is suitable for use in the anonymous survey because the change of relationships is indispensable in the anonymous survey for the collection of attribute statistics.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a Dynamic ABGS scheme that enables an access tree to be changed. Our ABGS is efficient in that re-issuing of the attribute certificate previously issued for each user is not necessary. Moreover, the number of calculations in a pairing does not depend on the number of attributes associated with a signature. A service provider obtains a collection of anonymous user's attribute statistics to improve service contents by using our ABGS.
